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The study of uncertainty in decision-making is receiving greater attention in the ﬁelds of cog-
nitive and computational neuroscience. Several lines of evidence are beginning to elucidate
different variants of uncertainty. Particularly, risk, ambiguity, and expected and unexpected
forms of uncertainty are well articulated in the literature. In this article we review both
empirical and theoretical evidence arguing for the potential distinction between three
forms of uncertainty; expected uncertainty, unexpected uncertainty, and volatility. Particular
attention will be devoted to exploring the distinction between unexpected uncertainty and
volatility which has been less appreciated in the literature. This includes evidence mainly
from neuroimaging, neuromodulation, and electrophysiological studies.We further address
the possible differentiation of cognitive control mechanisms used to deal with these forms
of uncertainty. Finally, we explore whether the dual modes of control theory provides a
theoretical framework for understanding the distinction between unexpected uncertainty
and volatility.
Keywords: uncertainty, unexpected uncertainty, volatility, decision-making
INTRODUCTION
Uncertainty is a common feature of many every day decisions.
Uncertainty typically arises in a situation that has limited or
incalculable information about the predicted outcomes of behav-
ior (Huettel et al., 2005). Successfully detecting, processing and
resolving uncertainty is important to successful adaptive behav-
ior. Recent years have seen a growing body of research dedicated
to exploring the brain mechanisms which underlie our choices
during conditions of uncertainty. However, it is becoming clear
that “uncertainty” is not comprised of a single dimension. More
recent evidence is beginning to differentiate neural correlates
involved in estimating, representing, and resolving different forms
of uncertainty. For example, studies have demonstrated separable
neural correlates of reward expectancy and variance (Preuschoff
et al., 2006; Tobler et al., 2007), reward probability and magnitude
(Knutson et al., 2005), and ambiguity and risk (Hsu et al., 2005;
Huettel et al., 2006). A major contribution of this work has been
a better understanding of how uncertainty can be induced by dif-
ferent variables in the decision-making environment. However, an
important form of uncertainty which has received less attention is
uncertainty induced by unexpected changes in learned Stimulus-
Response-Outcome (S-R-O) contingences, often referred to as
“unexpected uncertainty” or “volatility.” However, as we will dis-
cuss below, unexpected uncertainty and volatility do not nec-
essarily refer to the same phenomenon. Therefore, we review
theoretical and empirical arguments supporting a potential dis-
tinction between three different forms of uncertainty: expected
uncertainty, unexpected uncertainty, and volatility.
DISTINCT VARIETIES OF UNCERTAINTY
Successful decision-making relies on one’s ability to form a stable
representation of the underlying S-R-O rules learned from previ-
ous experience of gains and losses (e.g., Sutton and Barto, 1998;
Ridderinkhof et al., 2004; Seymour et al., 2007). As such, agents
can learn that a speciﬁc association between a stimulus (S) and a
response (R) is linked with a positive or negative outcome (O). For
instance, we may choose to enter (R) a particular restaurant (S)
if we have previously found that it serves our preferred dish (O).
Therefore through learning these associations between a Stimu-
lus (restaurant), a Response (enter), and its positive or negative
Outcome (preferred dish) we can guide future decision-making
in order to choose the Response which will most likely lead to a
rewarding Outcome. When faced with this kind of decision, an
agent has a prediction or expectation of the probability of an out-
come. This is derived from the recent history of outcomes of that
choice (Sutton and Barto, 1998). Therefore an agent must have
the ability to learn these S-R-O relationships and the likelihood to
which they occur in order to make the most optimal choices. If we
take the example above, our behavioral choice may be caused by
previous experiences in which we learned that our preferred dish
is available 8 out of 10 visits to that restaurant.
One of the most frequent methods used to manipulate uncer-
tainty usually involves the systematic variation of the probability
of these learned S-R-O contingencies. Using the example above, if
we begin to learn that our preferred dish is available only 6 out of
10 visits, this increases uncertainty about the potential outcome
(i.e., preferred dish) if we choose to enter this particular restau-
rant. In other words, when an agent is faced with a two-options
choice, uncertainty is often said to be maximal when the prob-
ability of obtaining a reward linked to any of the two options is
p= 0.5 but absent at the two extremes (probability= 1 and prob-
ability= 0; e.g., Fiorillo et al., 2003). Many studies have therefore
used variations of a 75/25% S-R-O probability to create certain
environments and 50/50% probability to create uncertain envi-
ronments (Volz et al., 2003; Paulus et al., 2004; Huettel et al., 2005;
Krain et al., 2006; Cohen et al., 2007b; Polezzi et al., 2008). It is also
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possible to explore varying degrees of uncertainty (e.g., Volz et al.,
2003; Huettel et al., 2005). Typically in these studies, participants
are shown cues which are probabilistic predictors of a given out-
come (e.g., a red triangle that predicts the occurrence of a reward
on 80% of trials). Uncertainty in these paradigms is induced by
lowering the predictability of the learned stimulus-response (S-R)
association being rewarded (O). For instance, varying degrees of
uncertainty may include 100, 90, 80, 70, 60, or 50% whereby 50%
is the most uncertain and 100% being the least uncertain. Further-
more, if the predictability goes below 50% then uncertainty will
decrease again, i.e., 40, 30, 20, 10, 0%.
A wealth of literature has begun to elucidate how the brain esti-
mates, represents, and resolves this form of uncertainty which is
induced by varying levels of probability. Neuroimaging evidence
indicates that the DLPFC (Paulus et al., 2002; Huettel et al., 2005),
posterior parietal cortex (Volz et al., 2003; Huettel et al., 2005),
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC; Elliott and Dolan, 1998; Critch-
ley et al., 2001; Stern et al., 2010), orbito-frontal cortex (OFC;
Goel and Dolan, 2000; Critchley et al., 2001; Hsu et al., 2005;
Tobler et al., 2007), and amygdala (Hsu et al., 2005) are involved
in processing uncertainty. Electrophysiological evidence points to
modulation of the P3, a positive going potential peaking around
300 ms post stimulus onset suggesting greater positivities are asso-
ciated with greater uncertainty (Duncan-Johnson and Donchin,
1977; Donchin and Coles, 1988; Polich, 1990).
Importantly however, uncertainty can also be induced by unex-
pected changes in S-R-O contingencies, above and beyond the
current S-R-O probability levels. For instance, using the example
above, we may choose to enter a particular restaurant if we have
previously found that our preferred dish is available 8 out of 10
visits to a particular restaurant. However, uncertainty could be
induced if this S-R-O contingency suddenly changes because the
usual kitchen chef was ﬁred and replaced by another chef with
different menu preferences which would take the “preferred dish
probability” to 0.2 on that week. In this case, the choice of available
dishes in that restaurant right after the replacement of the chef will
be uncertain because it can no longer be predicted by past experi-
ence. Therefore uncertainty can be induced not only by lowering
the probability of S-R-O contingencies, but also by fundamental
changes in these contingencies that forces a modiﬁcation of our
previous beliefs.
More recent approaches to uncertainty have begun to establish
that the two forms of uncertainty illustrated above refer to two
distinct processes. Particularly, uncertainty can arise from (a) the
stochasticity inherent in the decision-making environment (e.g.,
the stable probability of reward where an agent can learn that a
stimulus predicts rewards on 80% of trials is less uncertain than
a situation where this probability is set at 50%), and (b) from
unexpected and fundamental changes in the S-R-O contingencies
of the environment that invalidate prediction based on previous
experience (Yu and Dayan, 2005; Courville et al., 2006; Behrens
et al., 2007; Doya, 2008; Rushworth and Behrens, 2008; Krugel
et al., 2009; Nassar et al., 2010; Payzan-LeNestour and Bossaerts,
2011). The former is usually referred to as expected uncertainty (Yu
and Dayan, 2005) or Feedback Validity (e.g., Bland and Schaefer,
2011), and the latter is often referred to as unexpected uncertainty
(Yu and Dayan, 2005).
Recent developments suggest that volatility, has also to be con-
sidered (Behrens et al., 2007; Bland and Schaefer, 2011). Volatility
can be deﬁned as a variation in the frequency of changes in existing
S-R-O contingencies across time. In our example above, a stable
situation (low volatility) is attained when our preferred dish is
served in our chosen restaurant 8 days out of 10 during an entire
year. However, a volatile situation can arise if the manager of the
restaurant decides to dynamically change the menu several times
during the year. In such case, the “preferred dish probability” will
frequently change (e.g., 0.9 in the ﬁrst week, 0.2 in the secondweek,
0.7 in the thirdweek, etc.). In this case, the dynamic changes in S-R-
O contingencies will constrain agents to continually update their
representation of the environment in order to obtain accurate pre-
diction levels. Therefore volatility and unexpected uncertainty can
be distinguished by the frequency of contingency changes. Unex-
pected uncertainty is characterized by rare unpredicted changes in
underlying S-R-O rules, whereas high volatility is characterized by
frequent occurrences of fundamental changes in S-R-O rules. In
addition, it is important to note that a high frequency of changes
may potentially cause agents to learn that changes occur rapidly.
Therefore, volatility can be expected by decision-making agents.
In summary, three distinct forms of uncertainty can be iden-
tiﬁed: (1) Expected uncertainty: S-R-O rules learned from past
events are weak predictors of the outcomes of future actions, and
this unreliability is known and stable. (2) Unexpected uncertainty:
a rare fundamental change in the environment which invalidates
existing S-R-O rules that are no longer able to accurately predict
the outcomes of our actions. (3)Volatility: frequent changes in the
environment which require a constant updating of S-R-O rules1.
THE MODEL OF YU AND DAYAN (2005)
Yu andDayan (2005) have proposed a distinction between expected
and unexpected forms of uncertainty. Yu and Dayan employed a
task involving a set of arrows pointing to the left or right hand side
of a screen. The directions of the colored arrows are randomized
independently of each other on every trial, but one of them, the
cue, speciﬁed by its color, predicts the location of the subsequent
target (a light bulb) with a signiﬁcant probability whilst the rest
of the arrows are irrelevant distracters. The color of the cue arrow
(i.e., the “relevant” color which generally predicts the location of
the light bulb) persists over many trials, deﬁning a relatively sta-
ble context. However, the relevant cue color can suddenly change
without informing the subject.According toYu andDayan’s (2005)
1Although the main focus of this article was on human decision-making, these three
forms of uncertainty can also potentially be encountered in animals. For instance,
an animal may learn that pressing (response) a blue lever (stimulus) is paired with
food (outcome) for 7 out of 10 lever presses. It is reasonable to expect that through
learning, the animal might form a representation of the expected amount of error
(30%) in this S-R-O contingency (expected uncertainty). If the blue lever predicts
food delivery for only 2 out of 10 lever presses, there will be a fundamental change in
the contingencies that were previously guiding behavior (unexpected uncertainty),
and the animal must adapt to this new situation (probably through the exploration
of other levers present in the environment). However, if the association between
the lever press and the food reward is constantly changing then the environment
becomes volatile and in order to adapt, an optimal solution would be for the animal
to form a representation of the fact that these S-R-O contingencies are likely to
frequently change.
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inﬂuential theory, expected uncertainty arises from known unre-
liability of predictive relationships within a familiar environment
(e.g., learning that the relevant color predicts the location of the
light bulb on 80% of trials) whereas unexpected uncertainty is
induced by fundamental changes in the environment that pro-
duce sensory observations strongly violating expectations (e.g.,
the previously relevant color no longer predicts the location of
the target). The former has been equated with environmental sto-
chasticity in an otherwise stable S-R-O relationship (Nassar et al.,
2010). This stochasticity is analogous to uncertainty induced by
manipulating the predictive value of decision cues. So an agent can
learn that a cue predicts a reward on 80% of trials and so on 20%
of trials the outcome is not a valid predictor of the S-R-O rela-
tionship. This creates a level of expected uncertainty in a familiar
environment which can be thought of as the expected amount of
error. Indeed, an agent learns to expect that there will be a cer-
tain amount of uncertainty when making their decision through
sampling the environment. In other words, expected uncertainty
remains the same as long as the 20–80% contingencies are main-
tained, but unexpected uncertainty increases temporarily during
an uncued reversal from 80 to 20%.
Unexpected uncertainty arising from fundamental changes in
learned predictive relationships should signal for a revision of
an agent’s belief about the best course of action. Unexpected
uncertainty must therefore require a mechanism for suppressing
potentially outdated expectations and encouraging faster adapta-
tion to new S-R-O contingencies (Dayan and Yu, 2002). Indeed,
learning rate parameters tend to increase during periods of unex-
pected uncertainty (Yu and Dayan, 2005) and volatility (Behrens
et al., 2007; Nassar et al., 2010). In this way, fundamental changes
in S-R-O contingencies increase uncertainty, and speed up sub-
sequent learning, by making historical outcomes irrelevant and
new outcomes inﬂuencing beliefs strongly (Courville et al., 2006;
Nassar et al., 2010). Furthermore, surprise induced by changes in
S-R-O contingencies can enhance the speed of learning whereas
random variation under constant probabilities (as with a sequence
of coin ﬂips) will not be surprising (Courville et al., 2006).
Taken together, these ﬁndings highlight the importance of con-
sidering different forms of uncertainty and how they interact to
produce adaptive behavior. Importantly, an agent must possess
the neural and cognitive mechanisms to detect if an S-R-O contin-
gency has changed by representing the probabilistic chance that an
error is caused by inherent stochasticity. This parameter is crucial
for determining a contingency change. For instance, during every-
day decision-making, there is often only a probabilistic chance
(rather than a certainty) of success therefore the lack of reward on
a particular occasion may not necessarily signal the need to switch
to an alternative course of action (Kennerley et al., 2006). There-
fore, when a participant responds according to the learned S-R-O
rule and receives negative feedback, they must possess the ability
to infer whether the erroneous response is due to the inherent sto-
chasticity of the task or whether the S-R-O rule has fundamentally
changed. Therefore a changing world requires a mechanism which
will allow the successful detection and adaptation to both forms of
uncertainty. We will discuss in the remainder of this article some
mechanisms potentially involved in this adaptation. Most research
to date has conceptualized uncertainty as variations in expected
uncertainty (as well as slightly different forms of uncertainty,
such as ambiguity and risk). Although unexpected uncertainty
has received less attention, there is now a growing body of research
that has tackled this phenomenon. In addition, the potential dis-
tinction between unexpected uncertainty and volatility has not
received much attention, and both concepts tend to be somewhat
confounded in the literature. We will therefore review existing
evidence on unexpected uncertainty, and we will also review the
possibility that speciﬁc cognitive strategies might be employed
for volatility which are not necessarily employed for unexpected
uncertainty.
COMPUTATIONAL MODELING OF UNEXPECTED
UNCERTAINTY AND VOLATILITY
Modeling human behavior using computational approaches has
provided some important insights into the potential mechanisms
involved in decision-making under uncertainty. Such behavior
can be modeled by Bayesian algorithms (Behrens et al., 2007;
Nassar et al., 2010; Mathys et al., 2011). Indeed, Bayesian sta-
tistical theory formalizes the notion that optimal inference and
learning depend critically on representing and processing the var-
ious sorts of uncertainty associated with a behavioral context (Yu
and Dayan, 2005). In the speciﬁc case of volatility, it has been
suggested that humans adapt to a volatile decision-making envi-
ronment following Bayesian rules (Behrens et al., 2007; Nassar
et al., 2010). Particularly, Behrens et al. (2007) showed that using
an ideal Bayesian model, human participants can optimally assess
volatility and adjust decision-making accordingly to produce the
most advantageous future outcomes. In Behrens et al.’s (2007)
study, subjects carried out a one-armed bandit task in which they
had to choose between blue and green stimuli. Subjects under-
went trials where the probability of a blue outcome was 75% (a
certain/stable environment) and trials where reward probabili-
ties switched between 80% blue and 80% green every 30 or 40
trials (an uncertain/volatile environment). This study illustrated
howhumanparticipants repeatedly combineprior and subsequent
information as data accumulates, even when faced with a rapidly
changing environment by continually tracking the statistics of the
environment to assess the salience of every new piece of infor-
mation. Behrens et al.’s fMRI data suggests the BOLD activity in
the ACC might reﬂect a Bayesian estimate of the environment’s
volatility during a monitoring stage, i.e., when outcomes are being
evaluated in order to regulate current beliefs about the underlying
S-R contingencies of the environment. This model also suggests
that the ACC might encode how much inﬂuence feedback should
give to subsequent decisions, with more recent outcomes being
more salient in volatile contexts (Rushworth and Behrens, 2008).
Under aBayesian framework,unexpected observations increase
uncertaintywhereby a sustained level of such uncertainty results in
a high estimate for volatility, which in turn leads to a high learning
rate. Indeed, Behrens et al. (2007) showed that the learning rate
for human participants was adjusted depending on the estimate
of volatility. In situations where the S-R-O rules are changing, new
information has more inﬂuence. This is because looking too far
back in the history of rewarded outcomes is of little use if there
has been a recent fundamental change in S-R-O contingencies.
This can make prediction more difﬁcult and thus new outcomes
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have a large impact on future expectations either because they are
surprising (inducing a large prediction error) or because of uncer-
tainty about current expectations (inducing a large learning rate;
Rushworth andBehrens, 2008). Indeed, learning is enhancedwhen
outcomes occur that are not fully predicted, then slows down as
outcomes become increasingly predicted and endswhen outcomes
are fully predicted (Hollerman and Schultz, 1998).
Other studies have emphasized the idea that learning rates
are ﬂexibly adapted to best suit environmental statistics. In fast-
changing or volatile situations subjects learn quickly from new
outcomes thus a faster learning rate is required (Courville et al.,
2006). Indeed, Nassar et al. (2010) accurately modeled subjects’
behavior with a Bayesian model ﬁnding that the model adjusts the
inﬂuence of newly experienced outcomes according to on-going
estimates of uncertainty and the probability of a fundamental
change in the process by which outcomes are generated. Thus
outcomes that are unexpected because of a fundamental change
in the environment carry more inﬂuence than outcomes that are
unexpected because of persistent environmental stochasticity.
Together, evidence from computational models suggests that
agents can act in a Bayesian fashion in order to track S-R-O
contingencies and update these accordingly. In doing so, agents
can represent the level of expected uncertainty and use this to
detect unexpected changes in the decision-making environment.
Importantly however a distinction between unexpected uncer-
tainty and volatility has not been explicitly addressed in this
literature. Indeed, there appears to be differences in how these two
forms of uncertainty are computed. For instance, during unex-
pected uncertainty the agent must detect and adapt to the speciﬁc
change in contingency.However in volatile contexts the agentmust
also represent the frequency in which S-R-O contingencies are
changing. This is what Behrens et al. (2007) refer to as tracking
volatility as a high order statistic of the environment.
NEUROMODULATORS ASSOCIATED WITH UNCERTAINTY
Acetylcholine (ACh) and Noradrenaline (NA) may be critical
neurotransmitters involved in signaling expected and unexpected
sources of uncertainty (Phillips et al., 2000; Bouret and Sara, 2005;
Yu andDayan, 2005; Preuschoff et al., 2011;Avery et al., 2012). Par-
ticularly, ACh is said to signal expected uncertainty due to known
unreliability in the behavioral context whereas NA is said to sig-
nal unexpected uncertainty arising from fundamental changes in
the S-R-O contingencies. Evidence that ACh is crucial in expected
uncertainty comes from data that ACh varies inversely with the
level of estimated cue validity (Witte et al., 1997; Phillips et al.,
2000; Sarter andParikh, 2005;Yu andDayan, 2005). This cue valid-
ity represents the probability of the cue being correct, e.g. the cue is
a valid predictor of the S-R-O rule on 80%of trials. This is typically
constant over a whole experimental session and thus measures the
stochasticity of the task. This suggests that ACh reports a form
of expected uncertainty which can be learned through past expe-
rience of S-R-O relationships. Studies suggest that ACh increases
in a sustained fashion for expected unreliability of the environ-
ment when attention needs to be maintained (Dalley et al., 2001).
This implies that in order to grasp the predictive relationships
of an environment, an agent must utilize a temporally sustained
mechanism for estimating uncertainty.
It has been suggested that NA may signal unexpected uncer-
tainty (Bouret and Sara, 2005; Yu and Dayan, 2005; Preuschoff
et al., 2011; Avery et al., 2012). There is some empirical evidence
supporting this notion. For instance, the prefrontal NA system,
unlike the ACh system, is engaged by novel S-R-O contingencies,
which is compatible with a role in mechanisms of plasticity and
new learning (Dalley et al., 2001). Next, available evidence suggests
that NA originates in the locus coeruleus (LC) where LC neurons
ﬁre phasically (opposed to tonically) and robustly to unpredicted
changes in stimulus properties or reversal of S-R-O contingencies
(Aston-Jones et al., 1997; Yu and Dayan, 2003; Bouret and Sara,
2004). More recent evidence has shown that NA signals unex-
pected uncertainty asmeasured by pupil dilation (Preuschoff et al.,
2011). Indeed,Preuschoff et al. (2011)have shown that unexpected
uncertainty is closely linked with pupil size and is dissociated from
expected uncertainty. Pupil size is thought to correlate remarkably
with NA in both animal and human studies (Rajkowski et al.,
1993; Gilzenrat et al., 2010). Taken together, these observations
suggest that the LC-NA system facilitates attentional and cogni-
tive shifts in behavioral adaptation in changing environments (see
Sara, 2009). NA levels, could therefore signal when expectations
about our world need to be revised (Cohen et al., 2007a).
Although phasic bursts of NA activity are likely to signal unex-
pected uncertainty, volatility characterized by a high frequency
of fundamental S-R-O changes may be signaled by tonically high
levels of NA (Yu, 2007). Indeed, McClure et al. (2006) propose
that increased long-term response conﬂict (induced by frequent
changes in S-R-O contingencies) biases the LC toward a tonic NA
ﬁring mode to increase exploratory behavior. These authors sug-
gest that increased tonic ﬁring reﬂects increased environmental
uncertainty. This tonic mode of LC functioning may therefore
reﬂect volatility in the environment triggered by frequent changes
in the underlying rules guiding behavior.
Taken together, psychopharmacological evidence suggests that
unexpected uncertainty is linked with phasic bursts of NA which
signal changes in S-R-O contingencies. However expected uncer-
tainty shows a more tonic mode of ACh in order to temporally
sustain past S-R-O contingencies and hence the expected level
of stochasticity. Further, volatility could be signaled by tonic lev-
els of NA as opposed to phasic bursts (McClure et al., 2006; Yu,
2011). Therefore an important distinction could be made between
unexpected uncertainty and volatility in terms of their temporal
characteristics of neuromodulation.
EXPLOITATION VERSUS EXPLORATION DILEMMA
Some authors suggest that the distinction between expected and
unexpected forms of uncertainty may be an important element
in behavioral adaptation i.e., in choosing whether to explore or
exploit the decision-making environment (Cohen et al., 2007a).
The exploitation versus exploration dilemma suggests a trade-off
between persisting in our current behavior (exploit) or selecting
alternative options (explore) in reinforcement learning. For exam-
ple, if we experience a poor qualitymeal at our preferred restaurant
then we could choose to persist in our current behavior and con-
tinue to visit the restaurant on the assumption that the restaurant
is still the best option given its good past record (exploitation).
Alternatively, we may decide to explore other restaurants in search
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of a better dining experience (exploration). Indeed, the exploita-
tion versus exploration trade-off is a fundamental challenge for the
adaptive control of behavior (Cohen et al., 2007a).
Particularly relevant is that uncertainty may precede the deci-
sion to explore an alternative option or exploit the current situa-
tion (Daw et al., 2006; Cohen et al., 2007a; Frank et al., 2009). For
example, the detectionof unexpecteduncertainty canbe an impor-
tant signal of the need to promote exploration and has a central
role in the acquisition of adaptive behavior in environments that
change (Daw et al., 2006; Cohen et al., 2007a). For instance, in a
familiar, reliable environmentwith a stable level of expected uncer-
tainty, there is no need for exploration (i.e., the restaurant chef
works 8 out of every 10 days so we are likely to gain our preferred
dish on 80%of visits, thuswe are just exploiting knowledge learned
from previous experiences). If we experience a bad meal which is
a consequence of a brief absence of the chef then we may continue
to visit this restaurant (exploit). In contrast, during unexpected
changes in the environment that lead to a durable invalidity of our
previous representations, one needs to take exploratory actions
(Doya, 2008). For instance, if we experience a poor meal because
the previous chef was ﬁred and replaced by a less experienced chef,
this unexpected uncertainty about future visits to the restaurant
might promote our exploration of other restaurants. Therefore
uncertainty-driven exploration is a potentially important facet of
decision-making and adaptive behavior (Cavanagh et al., 2011).
Research has begun to show that trial-to-trial variations in
response-locked frontal theta are related to unexpected uncer-
tainty and are larger in individuals who use uncertainty to guide
exploration (Cavanagh et al., 2011). In addition, empirical studies
have begun to reveal mechanisms that animals may use to adapt
to changes in the environment, by regulating the balance between
exploitation and exploration. These studies appear to be converg-
ing on the view that neuromodulatory systems; in particular, ACh
and NA, interacting with DA-mediated reinforcement learning
mechanisms may play a critical role in unexpected uncertainty
induced exploration (Cohen et al., 2007a). Indeed, recent stud-
ies ﬁnd that shifts between task engagement (exploitation) and
disengagement (exploration) affect the pupil response which is
thought to index NA neurotransmission (Preuschoff et al., 2011).
This is consistent with Yu and Dayan (2005) theory of unexpected
uncertainty and the adaptive gain theory of LC-NA (noradrena-
line) mediated explore/exploit behavior (Aston-Jones and Cohen,
2005).
Together this evidence suggests a close relationship between
uncertainty and the adaptive control of behavior. Indeed, it
appears likely that uncertainty, and particularly unexpected uncer-
tainty signals a contextual change which promotes exploratory
adaptive behavior. Conversely, by tracking past representations of
S-R-O rules and measuring the stochasticity of the environment,
one can represent a form of expected uncertainty which promotes
exploitative behavior. The interaction of expected and unexpected
forms of uncertainty is likely to drive behavior in an optimal man-
ner. Therefore it may be the case that successfully adapting to
uncertainty could depend upon the levels of expected uncertainty
and the frequency of changes in S-R-O contingencies.
To our knowledge, the distinction between volatility and unex-
pected uncertainty has not been explicitly articulated from the
perspective of exploitation/exploration behaviors. However, it is
reasonable to think that volatility should be characterized by a
state in which the need for sustained exploration is anticipated.
Indeed, if volatility leads to the formation of a representation
that an underlying S-R-O rule can frequently change, then this
should enable decision-making agents to be prepared to engage in
exploration in this type of contexts. A possible prediction is that
exploratory behaviors following an S-R-O rule change would be
more rapidly engaged in volatile contexts compared to situations
where S-R-O changes are rare because the need for exploration
is anticipated. Further research will be needed to examine this
question.
COGNITIVE CONTROL
As we have outlined, an emerging body of literature is beginning
to demonstrate how different forms of uncertainty are processed.
One aspect that has yet to be adequately addressed is the poten-
tial involvement of cognitive control processes in the resolution of
uncertainty (Mushtaq et al., 2011). Indeed, the ability to rapidly
and ﬂexibly adjust behavior to changing environmental demands
is a deﬁning characteristic of cognitive control (Braver et al., 2003).
Therefore successful adaptation to unexpected uncertainty may
require the involvement of the dynamic and ﬂexible engagement
of cognitive control functions. Interestingly, different cognitive
control strategies may be utilized to deal with different forms of
uncertainty (i.e., expected uncertainty, unexpected uncertainty,
and volatility). Particularly conﬂict monitoring mechanisms and
working memory (WM) are two canonical instances of cognitive
control processes that appear to be likely candidates for success-
ful adaption to various forms of uncertainty (Bland and Schaefer,
2011; Mushtaq et al., 2011).
CONFLICT MONITORING AND WORKING MEMORY
The conﬂict hypothesis (Botvinick et al., 2001; van Veen and
Carter, 2002; Kerns et al., 2004) provides a theoretical frame-
work that can be used to understand some of the interactions
between uncertainty and cognitive control. According to the con-
ﬂict hypothesis, adjustments in cognitive control are likely to occur
during a high degree of response conﬂict (Botvinick et al., 2001).
According to this hypothesis, response conﬂict occurs whenever
two or more incompatible response tendencies are simultaneously
active. For example, response conﬂict is highwhen a responsemust
be withheld in contexts in which there is a pre-potent tendency to
make an overt response (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2003). Therefore, a
change in learned S-R-O contingencies might require inhibiting
habitual behavior (e.g., learned from the previous S-R-O rule) fol-
lowing a negative outcome, and overriding it with new behavior
adapted to the new rule. This type of behavioral adaptation is
likely to rely on conﬂict processing, that is, the ability to efﬁciently
arbitrate between two conﬂicting behavioral responses (usually a
habitual response that needs to be overridden by a new response).
Conﬂict processing is thought to be a key mode of cognitive con-
trol (Botvinick et al., 2001; Yeung and Cohen, 2006), and it is
more often observed in tasks with a habitual context interrupted
by rare high-conﬂict trials (Botvinick et al., 1999). Indeed, changes
in learned S-R-O contingencies and hence unexpected uncertainty
are likely to produce conﬂict and so unexpected uncertainty may
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be important in signaling the need for increased cognitive control
in order to successfully adapt behavior (Mushtaq et al., 2011).
In addition to conﬂict monitoring mechanism, WM may also
play an important role in successfully adapting to varying forms
of uncertainty. WM is deﬁned as a system providing temporary
storage, manipulation and processing of information (Badde-
ley, 1992) and is kept on-line or available for immediate access
by other cognitive processes (Awh and Jonides, 2001). WM has
a key role in active maintenance and updating of information
in order to allow task-relevant information to be utilized in
a manner that directly biases on-going processing. This makes
WM a likely candidate in decision-making whereby adaptive
choices in an uncertain environment relies on tracking S-R-O
contingencies and the ability to monitor and update for any
changes in S-R-O associations. WM is particularly important in
many tasks that require the active maintenance and updating of
information in order to facilitate goal directed behavior (Owen
et al., 2005). Therefore the concepts of WM and cognitive con-
trol may be closely linked with decision-making in situations
where S-R-O changes might occur such as unexpected uncer-
tainty or volatility. We will next review the link between cog-
nitive control and different varieties of uncertainty from three
perspectives: Neuroimaging studies (fMRI and ERP), models
suggesting the existence of distinct modes of cognitive control
(Koechlin et al., 2003; Braver et al., 2007) and neuromodulation
studies.
NEURAL CORRELATES OF COGNITIVE CONTROL IN UNCERTAIN
ENVIRONMENTS
Neuroimaging evidence has demonstrated greater ACC activa-
tion in studies examining conﬂict and conﬂict monitoring (Carter
et al., 1998; Botvinick et al., 2001). The error-related negativity
(ERN), a negative deﬂection in the ERP waveform at the time
of an erroneous response (e.g., Gehring et al., 1990) which also
originates in the ACC (Dehaene et al., 1994) is thought to be an
electrophysiological marker which underlies a conﬂict monitor-
ing mechanism (Carter et al., 1998; Botvinick et al., 1999, 2001;
Yeung and Cohen, 2006). In addition, the anterior N2, an ERP
thought to be generated in the ACC, has also been shown to
reﬂect the monitoring of response conﬂict (Nieuwenhuis et al.,
2003; Yeung et al., 2004). Importantly, the N2 has been associated
with volatility in a habitual environment (Bland and Schaefer,
2011). Bland and Schaefer (2011) presented participants with
either a blue or red triangle which was associated with two possi-
ble responses. Participants had to learn the correct S-R-O rule
(red triangle – response 1= reward; blue triangle – response
2= reward). In this task two contextual determinants of deci-
sion uncertainty were independently manipulated: Volatility (i.e.,
the frequency of changes in the S-R-O rules) and Feedback valid-
ity (i.e., the extent to which an S-R-O rule accurately predicts
outcomes, synonymous with expected uncertainty). Bland and
Schaefer (2011) demonstrated that frequent S-R-O rule changes
in an otherwise predictable environment (where Feedback valid-
ity is high) was associated with a frontally based N2 component.
This perhaps reﬂects the implementation of cognitive control
through a mechanism suited to detecting conﬂict in learned S-R-O
contingencies.
In relation to the conﬂict hypothesis, it has been suggested that
the detection of conﬂict by the ACC leads to the delivery of trigger
signals to systems specialized in implementing control (e.g., the
prefrontal cortex, PFC). Support for this idea comes from evi-
dence suggesting that conﬂict-related activity in ACC predicts a
subsequent increase in PFC activity and corresponding adjust-
ments in performance (Kerns et al., 2004). Speciﬁcally, the ACC
is thought to play an essential role in the adjustment of execu-
tive control mechanisms governed by the PFC (Botvinick et al.,
2001; Kerns et al., 2004; Brown and Braver, 2005; Egner and
Hirsch, 2005; di Pellegrino et al., 2007; Mansouri et al., 2009).
Given that unexpected uncertainty and volatility are characterized
by environmental changes requiring the suppression or adjust-
ment of existing S-R-O representations, these forms of uncertainty
could then be seen as states that trigger conﬂict and therefore the
cascade of processes leading to the implementation of cognitive
control processes. In other words, these forms of uncertainty can
be perceived as a summary of the contextual antecedents of the
implementation of cognitive control processes (Mushtaq et al.,
2011).
Another theoretical interpretation proposes a link between
unexpected uncertainty and speciﬁcmechanisms of cognitive con-
trol (Nieuwenhuis, 2011). An interesting review by Nieuwenhuis
(2011) addresses the relationship between the LC system and
the P3 ERP. By bringing together Yu and Dayan’s (2005) the-
ory and the prominent theory of the P3 proposed by Donchin
(1981),Nieuwenhuis (2011) explores how unexpected uncertainty
requires agents to update their representation of the environ-
ment. Indeed, a surprising and unexpected outcome must call
for revision of an agent’s mental model of the decision-making
environment. This is indexed by the P3 amplitude which is
strongly thought to be generated by the LC and NA signaling.
An increased phasic release of NA may have direct enhancing
effects on task-speciﬁc control representations in PFC contribut-
ing to the compensatory increase in control following a transient
decrease in performance and/or reward (Aston-Jones and Cohen,
2005). Global changes in the external environment thus serves as
an alarm system for contextual switches. Indeed, empirical studies
are beginning to show that the variants of the P3 and late positive
complex (LPC) are associated with changing S-R-O contingen-
cies (Bland and Schaefer, 2011). Bland and Schaefer (2011) also
demonstrated that frequent S-R-O rule changes in a challenging
environment (where Feedback validity is low) was associated with
a frontally based LPC component. This perhaps reﬂects a mech-
anism for integrating past outcomes in order to update a mental
model of the current S-R-O contingency and the frequency in
which it occurs. An S-R-O rule change is likely to signal for a revi-
sion in one’s mental model which is likely to be reﬂected in the
enhanced amplitude of the P3/LPC complex. This is in contrast to
a rule change in an otherwise fairly habitual context (highFeedback
validity) where volatility is indexed by anN2 component and likely
reﬂects conﬂict monitoring (Bland and Schaefer, 2011). Therefore,
there is some evidence to point to different forms of cognitive
control depending on the interaction of expected uncertainty and
volatility.However,unexpected uncertainty and volatility are yet to
be explicitly dissociated in neuroimaging and electrophysiological
studies.
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SEPARABLE MODES OF COGNITIVE CONTROL
Recent studies are beginning to explore differential modes of
cognitive control which may have important overlaps with the
computational and neurobiological evidence outlined above. The
dual modes of control (DMC) theory (Braver et al., 2007, 2009)
suggests that cognitive ﬂexibility can be achieved by modulating
themanner inwhich a particular controlmechanism is deployed in
response to changing task demands or internal goal states. Speciﬁ-
cally, this theory proposes a distinction between proactive and reac-
tive modes of cognitive control (Braver et al., 2007). The proactive
control is the early selection of goal-relevant information which
is actively maintained in a sustained/anticipatory manner, before
the occurrence of cognitively demanding events, to optimally bias
attention, perception, and action systems in a goal-driven man-
ner. In contrast, the reactive mode is a late correction mechanism
whereby cognitive control is recruited only as needed, such as
after a high-interference event is detected. Thus, proactive control
relies on the anticipation and prevention of interference before it
occurs, whereas reactive control relies on the post hoc detection
and resolution of interference after its onset (Braver et al., 2009).
A clear prediction of this hypothesis is that proactive and reac-
tive control can be distinguished in terms of lateral PFC activity.
For instance, proactive control should be associated with sustained
and/or anticipatory activation of PFC, which reﬂects the active
maintenance of task goals. In contrast, reactive control should be
reﬂected in transient activation of lateral PFC, along with a wider
network of additional brain regions including the ACC (Braver
et al., 2007, 2009). In addition, the DMC theory has been related
to distinct ERP components. Particularly, it has been claimed that
the P3 and late positivities are linked to proactive control and N2
to reactive control (van Wouwe et al., 2011). Interestingly, the P3
has been linked to WM and sustained maintenance of informa-
tion in WM (Duncan-Johnson and Donchin, 1982) and the N2
has been linked with conﬂict monitoring and error detection (van
Veen and Carter, 2002).
Importantly, proactive and reactive modes of control may be
useful in successfully adapting to different forms of uncertainty.
The DMC theory suggests that the temporal dynamics of neural
activity can differ between a transient to a predominantly tonic
mode. For instance, expected uncertainty may involve a more
proactive mode of control in order to implement sustained atten-
tional resources to facilitate internal representations of S-R-O
contingencies (however, it might also be argued that automatic
processes might be sufﬁcient in a situation with learned and stable
levels of expected uncertainty).
Separable modes of control have also been proposed by Koech-
lin and colleagues using a hierarchical framework. Koechlin et
al. suggest two forms of control; contextual and episodic control
(Koechlin et al., 2003; Koechlin and Summerﬁeld, 2007). Con-
textual control refers to the use of a current cue (context) for
selecting task appropriate behavior whereas episodic control, refers
to the use of past cues that determine, for an extended period
of time the way that current stimuli and contextual cues are
interpreted (Egner, 2009). The modes of control are arranged
hierarchically whereby episodic control affects contextual control,
but not vice versa. According to Kouneiher et al. (2009) transient
posterior-lateral PFC regions subserve contextual control whilst
sustained mid-lateral PFC regions are associated with episodic
control. Importantly, these two modes of control may also play
a role in adapting to different forms of uncertainty. For instance,
episodic control refers to temporally extended information over
a behavioral episode. This requires a sustained mechanism to
integrate past representations and form a mental model of the
environment. This mode of control may therefore be particularly
important to integrating past S-R-O occurrences and representing
expected forms of uncertainty. Conversely, contextual control as
indicated by transient neural activity in the PFC may be useful in
detecting contextual shifts such as a change in underlying S-R-O
contingencies.
Together the theories outlined above suggest that there are sep-
arable modes of cognitive control. Here, we suggest that these may
be particularly relevant to estimating and resolving different forms
of uncertainty. As suggested above, expected forms of uncertainty
may be estimated by sustained episodic control (Kouneiher et al.,
2009) or proactive control (Braver et al., 2009) whilst unexpected
forms of uncertainty may be detected by transient contextual con-
trol (Kouneiher et al., 2009) or reactive control (Braver et al.,
2009).
Importantly however, a reactive mode of control may not nec-
essarily be the most optimal mode in volatile environments in
which a high frequency of S-R-O changes occur. Indeed, an agent
may learn that the environment is frequently changing and thus
these unexpected changes may become anticipated. Therefore a
proactive mode of control may be ideal in this type of environ-
ment for two reasons. First, it would allow a sustained activation
of a representation of the frequency of changes in the environment
and hence the potential need for constant exploratory behaviors.
Second, a proactive mode of control would allow the maintenance
and integration of temporally extended information about past S-
R-O contingencies in order to dynamically update current mental
models. A parallel could be drawn from the theory of Koechlin
et al. (2003), Koechlin and Summerﬁeld (2007), Kouneiher et al.
(2009) from which it could be speculated that episodic control
could also be useful in order to integrate temporally extended
information needed to successfully adapt to volatile situations.
A common theme across these theories is that the separable
modes of control can be distinguished by sustained and transient
neural activity. This may be particularly important for estimating
different forms of uncertainty. Indeed, neurotransmitters thought
to underlie expected and unexpected forms of uncertainly have
been distinguished by tonic and phasic activity. For instance, ACh
increases in a sustained fashion for expected unreliability of the
environment (Dalley et al., 2001) and is involved in a prolonged
state of readiness to respond to rarely and unpredictable occurring
signals (Sarter et al., 2001). It could therefore be speculated that
unexpected uncertainty would be associated to transient forms
of neural activity related to cognitive control, whereas volatility
would be associated to more sustained patterns of neural activity
in cognitive control brain networks.
ADAPTIVE GAIN THEORY OF LC-NA FUNCTIONING
The adaptive gain theory of LC-NA functioning suggests that there
are at least two distinguishable modes of LC function which drive
behavior. In a phasic mode, bursts of LC activity are observed
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in association with the outcome of decision processes and are
closely coupled with behavioral responses that are generally highly
accurate. In a tonic mode however, LC baseline activity is ele-
vated but phasic bursts of activity are absent (Aston-Jones and
Cohen, 2005). Interestingly it has been proposed that the OFC
and ACC could drive this LC phasic activity directly which in
turn promotes exploratory or exploitative behavior (Aston-Jones
and Cohen, 2005). This may have important implications for the
mode in which cognitive control is implemented. For instance,
unexpected uncertainty arises from strong violations of predic-
tions that are expected to be correct (Yu and Dayan, 2005). Phasic
NA signals have been associated with novelty and changes in
S-R-O contingencies (Aston-Jones et al., 1997; Aston-Jones and
Cohen, 2005; Yu and Dayan, 2005; Avery et al., 2012). This would
ﬁt well with a reactive mode of control which arises as a conse-
quence of high-conﬂict events (Braver et al., 2007) which could
be cause by strong violations of predictions. Furthermore this is
also linked with a view that unexpected uncertainty is induced by
a mismatch between prediction and observation and is signaled
phasically with rapid habituation (Yu and Dayan, 2005). Indeed,
strong projections from the OFC and ACC to the LC may drive
this phasic response where signals from OFC and ACC augment
the LC phasic release of NA thus improving performance on sub-
sequent trials (Aston-Jones et al., 2002; Aston-Jones and Cohen,
2005). According to the adaptive gain theory, this effect could
further contribute to the compensatory increase in control fol-
lowing a transient decrease in performance and/or reward. Indeed,
empirical evidence suggests that NA is speciﬁcally involved in per-
formance monitoring (Riba et al., 2005). Furthermore, there is
substantial evidence for the modulatory inﬂuence of NA on cog-
nitive functions that depend on the frontal cortex, particularly
selective attention and working-memory tasks (Sara, 2009).
The adaptive gain theory further suggests that signals from
ACC to LC (indicating an adverse outcome), possibly comple-
mented by signals from OFC to LC (indicating absence of an
expected reward) may augment the LC phasic mode (Aston-Jones
and Cohen, 2005). This, in turn, would improve performance
on subsequent trials by enhancing the LC phasic release of NA
thus having direct enhancing effects on task-speciﬁc control rep-
resentations in PFC (Aston-Jones and Cohen, 2005). Thus conﬂict
detection as reﬂected by the ACC response which then sends trig-
gers for compensatory adjustments in cognitive control may be
mediated by LC-NA functioning. This would be consistent with
Yu and Dayan’s (2005) theoretical framework of NA functioning
as a signal for unexpected uncertainty.
Indeed unexpected uncertainty can be seen as a state signal-
ing the potential need to suppress of previous S-R-O rules in
order to override these with more adaptive S-R-O contingencies.
This requires ﬂexible adaption of behavior in environments that
are changeable. Thus signaling of NA in response to unexpected
uncertainty may be crucially involved in ACC-PFC implementa-
tion of cognitive control. Indeed, functional neuroimaging studies
investigatinguncertainty haveuncovered aneural network that has
a remarkable overlap with brain networks usually associated with
cognitive control tasks. In particular, a network involving lateral
PFC areas, parietal cortex and the ACC seems to be constantly
activated for decision-making tasks in which volatility and
expected forms of uncertainty are manipulated and also in a wide
range of classical cognitive control tasks (for a review of the neural
correlates of uncertainty and cognitive control see Mushtaq et al.,
2011). Therefore cognitive control andparticularly a reactivemode
as indexed by early negativities in the EEG and ACC ﬂuctuations
in the BOLD response as well as phasic bursts of NA may be par-
ticularly important for estimating, detecting, and resolving unex-
pected uncertainty. Alternatively, a proactive control mode char-
acterized by sustained neural activity in the PFC and the P3/LPC
complex may be important for successful integration of past out-
comes in order to measures the stochasticity of the environment
and deal with expected uncertainty. However, it is also likely that
stable levels of stochasticity could be learned through automatic
processes without the involvement of cognitive control processes.
In addition, it is possible that proactive control might be also par-
ticularly useful in volatile contexts,where the temporally sustained
maintenance and updating of past outcome information in WM
might be useful to adapt to a context of frequent S-R-O changes.
In summary, it seems that reactive control could be used follow-
ing a highly unexpected S-R-O change. However, a proactive mode
can be very efﬁcient at dealing with volatility. Therefore unex-
pected uncertainty and volatility should be differentiated: unex-
pected uncertainty occurs from a single or infrequent unpredicted
fundamental changes in S-R-O contingency whereas volatility can
be seen as a series of frequent fundamental changes in S-R-O
frequencies, and this frequency of changes can itself become pre-
dictable. For our example above, a volatile situation is reached
when our usual restaurant tends to hire a new chef very often
during the year. If customers know this tendency, they will be
able to use proactive strategies in order to detect if a change in
the quality of the food is due to a transient change in a more
stable pattern (e.g., the usual chef is absent 1 day every week) or
if it reﬂects a more fundamental change, i.e., the previous chef
was ﬁred and replaced by a new one). Therefore how the brain
estimates the relative frequency of changes on the environment is
crucial. Behrens et al. (2007) suggest that this is reﬂected by ACC
activity. Indeed, the ACC may be able to estimate the rate at which
reward contingencies are changing and signal to the PFC to imple-
ment a reactive or more proactive mode of control. This likely
reﬂects a highly sophisticated control mechanism which adjusts
for suitable changes in the environment as possibly reﬂected by
neuromodulation of ACh and NA mediated by the ACC-PFC.
SYNTHESIS AND CONCLUSIONS
We have reviewed existing empirical evidence and theoretical evi-
dence in order to form a case for considering three distinct forms
of uncertainty; expected uncertainty, unexpected uncertainty, and
volatility.Whilst expected uncertainty has receivedmuch attention
in the literature, the latter two forms of uncertainty are relatively
less well explored. Nevertheless a growing body of literature is
beginning to unravel how the brain deals with unexpected changes
in the environment. This is an exciting line of research which is
beginning to prove fruitful (Yu and Dayan, 2005; Behrens et al.,
2007; Doya, 2008; Krugel et al., 2009; Nassar et al., 2010; Bland and
Schaefer, 2011; Nieuwenhuis, 2011; Preuschoff et al., 2011).
However an explicit distinction between unexpected uncer-
tainty and volatility has yet to be addressed. We have suggested
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that computational modeling studies provide evidence of how
we can deal with unexpected changes in S-R-O contingences and
adjust the learning rate accordingly. However, volatility appears to
promote a further computation by representing a“volatility”para-
meter as a high order statistic of the environment (Behrens et al.,
2007). Next, the temporal activity of neuromodulators involved
in signaling uncertainty may differentiate unexpected uncertainty
and volatility. Particularly, unexpected uncertainty appears to be
signaled by phasic bursts of NA activity whereas prolonged unex-
pected uncertainty i.e., volatility may recruit a more tonic mode.
Finally these two forms of uncertainty may be differentiated in
terms of the involvement of distinct cognitive control modes.
It is possible that unexpected changes may be dealt with by a
reactive mode of control recruiting conﬂict detection mecha-
nisms to overcome competing responses in S-R-O contingencies.
Alternatively successful adaptation to volatility may be associ-
ated with a proactive and sustained mode of control through the
continual maintenance and updating of S-R-O contingencies in
WM.
In addition, a number of questions remain open. For instance,
it is unclear at this stage whether volatility and unexpected uncer-
tainty are associated with distinct brain networks. The evidence
reviewed above about the potential involvement of distinct cog-
nitive processes in these two forms of uncertainty suggests that
they could be dissociated in terms of their neural correlates.
Further research will be necessary to address this question. A
more fundamental question regards the nature of the distinc-
tion between volatility and unexpected uncertainty. The main
difference between them is the frequency of S-R-O changes in a
given period of time. This frequency can be manipulated in a
gradual, continuous way. However, it can be speculated that sys-
tems involved in processing uncertainty should be able to detect a
threshold beyond which the processes implemented to deal with
the environmentwill change (e.g., switching froma reactive toward
a proactive mode of control). Further research will be needed to
test this idea. Finally, although the theoretical avenues considered
in this article suggest that volatility and unexpected uncertainty
might lead to different modes of cognitive control, and to differ-
ent neuromodulatory patterns, most of these ideas remain yet to
be empirically tested.
In summary, this article has reviewed empirical and theoret-
ical evidence for the distinction between three forms of uncer-
tainty, and in particular, it highlighted a distinction between a
rare unexpected change (unexpected uncertainty) and a frequently
changing environment (volatility). Future research should there-
fore form a clear distinction between unexpected uncertainty and
volatility in order to further explore how we successfully estimate,
represent, and resolve these different forms of uncertainty.
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